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NEW WINE OLD WINESKINS:
EMERGING ISSUES IN INTERNET-
BASED PERSONAL JURISDICTION
JEFFREY HUNTER MOON, ESQ.*
In the Internet context, the issue of personal jurisdiction
arises most often in cases claiming trademark or copyright
infringement, consumer or business fraud, and defamation,
although there are a number of personal injury cases that
address Internet-based personal jurisdiction questions.1 This is
an emerging area of the law-virtually none of the cases
discussed below is more than five years old. Consider a
hypothetical scenario: suppose someone sues your church-related
organization saying that it has infringed his copyright, or
perhaps defamed him. Suppose further that he sues in federal
district court in Alaska. What if your church-related
organization had never sent any officers or employees to Alaska,
had no offices in Alaska, and had no programs in Alaska, and
never had? Would you anticipate that your organization and its
individual managers could be forced to defend litigation in
Alaska, hire lawyers there, try a lawsuit there, and potentially
be subject to the substantive law of the state of Alaska, laws that
you aren't even aware of? The answer is that if certain contacts
existed, even if they were created only over the Internet, you
certainly could. This raises issues that are tremendously
important to everyone managing an organization doing virtually
anything over the Internet, all the more so when doing it for a
charitable or religious organization that cannot simply "pass on
all the costs of doing business" to its "customers" the way Dell
Computers or General Motors can.
The jurisdictional issue itself-leaving aside for the moment
the merits of such a suit-has the potential to negatively affect
'Solicitor, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops.
See, e.g., Dagesse v. Plant Hotel N.V., 113 F. Supp. 2d 211 (D.N.H. 2000).
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costs, damage your business operations, and therefore the
important social, educational, and religious programs that your
clients are responsible for conducting, and it may
disadvantageously affect the substantive legal rules applicable to
you, including what sanctions or penalties can be imposed
against your clients.
Of course this raises the issue of "choice of laws"-the
question of what substantive law is going to be applied. This
issue is beyond the scope of this presentation, but obviously, just
because a federal court in a given state decides it has personal
jurisdiction over all of the players in a lawsuit does not
necessarily mean that it could apply that state's substantive law
to the claims. However, if no issue is made about that by one of
the parties, the trial court will generally apply the substantive
law of the forum state.
The question whether your organization can be held subject
to the personal jurisdiction of a court system in another state,
requires an affirmative answer to two questions: first, does the
forum state have a statute that says that you can be held subject
to that state's jurisdiction? Second, does the Due Process Clause
of our Federal Constitution permit that exercise of jurisdiction?
The first of these two questions is answered by reference to
the putative forum state's "long arm" statute. In practice, this is
not usually a complex question. Some states-most particularly
Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, New Mexico, and New York-
have meaningful limits, restricting jurisdiction over out-of-state
actors to specific enumerated acts, or particular time periods, or
impose other limits. Other states either have a "long arm
statute" that permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction just as
far as the Constitution's Due Process Clause permits, or have
specific enumerated areas of jurisdiction plus a so-called "catch-
all" provision that practically speaking extends up to the limits
of the Federal Constitution. So one looks first to the putative
forum state's long-arm statute to answer that first, state-law,
question.
As to the second question, if the forum state cannot exercise
personal jurisdiction over a defendant consistent with our
constitutional notions of "Due Process," then it may not do so at
all. The essential Due Process question has not changed: are
there sufficient "minimum contacts" on the part of the
defendant, with the "forum state," such that it accords with
INTERNET-BASED PERSONAL JURISDICTION
traditional notions of fair play for the defendant to be forced to
defend itself, in court, there? 2  There is a "foreseeability"
component to this: the defendant's conduct and connection with
the forum state must be such that it should reasonably expect to
be "haled into court" there.3  Personal jurisdiction is not,
therefore, to be based on "random, isolated, or fortuitous"
contacts. 4 And the defendant's own actions must have created
those contacts. 5 Personal jurisdiction must either be "specific" or
''general."
Specific Jurisdiction: The question is, has the defendant
purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of the
forum state in taking the specific actions out of which the
litigation arises, so that it could be brought into court there?6
General iurisdiction is a broader concept: has the defendant
had "systematic and continuous contacts" with the forum state,
even leaving aside the acts that led to the litigation, such that it
is fair to force the defendant to defend a lawsuit in the forum
state.7  Apropos the title of this presentation, these same
jurisdictional concepts all apply to the e-commerce or e-
communication framework, just as they do to conduct and
actions that have no connection at all to the Internet. The ways
in which these concepts have been interpreted and applied in
practice, however, lead to some generally-applicable guidelines
that are, indeed, peculiar to the Internet and e-mail context.
The bottom line, generally, is that personal jurisdictional
questions are answered by reference to a "sliding scale" that
looks at the number, quality, and types of contacts that a
putative defendant has had with the forum state. The two key
cases are Zippo Manfacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.,8 and a
case from two years later, Mink v. AAAA Development.9
Zippo involved a suit by the famous Zippo cigarette lighter
company. It sued Zippo Dot Coin, a computer news service
2 See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
3 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
4 See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984).
5 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
6 See Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, N.A. v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217 (3d Cir.
1992).
7 See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408
(1984).
8 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
9 190 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999).
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which used several domain names including "zippo.com,"
"zippo.net," and "zippo-news.com." The lighter company believed
itself aggrieved, and it sued alleging trademark dilution,
trademark infringement, false designation under the Federal
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994), and making a
state law "trademark dilution" claim. Zippo Manufacturing sued
in the Western District of Pennsylvania, and Zippo Dot Com
moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Zippo Dot
Com "existed," in the conventional sense, only in California, in
that all its offices, employees, and Internet servers were located
there. It had no offices, employees, or agents in Pennsylvania.
Its only relationship to Pennsylvania was that its webpage was
available to people in Pennsylvania, and that out of 140,000
subscribers, 3,000 were Pennsylvania residents. Subscribers
had agreed, over the Internet, to pay fees for Zippo Dot Com's
news services, and many had made their payments for these
subscriptions via the Internet.
The court held that Zippo Dot Coin's conduct of electronic
business with Pennsylvania residents constituted the purposeful
availment of the privilege of doing business in Pennsylvania.
Zippo Dot Com did not merely advertise over the web, and its
contacts with Pennsylvania residents were not, from its
standpoint, "fortuitous" at all. Rather, it had made a conscious
choice to do business with residents of the forum state and a
significant amount of the alleged dilution and infringement
occurred in Pennsylvania. Thus, specific personal jurisdiction
was found to exist in Pennsylvania.
From Zippo, we get this basic formulation: that Internet-
based personal jurisdiction is a "sliding scale" issue, and that it
turns upon the "nature and quality of commercial activity" that
the defendant conducts over the Internet. 10
Zippo's standards were further refined three years later by
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Mink. In Mink, the
court rejected the argument that a federal court in Texas could
assert personal jurisdiction over a Vermont corporation by way
of its website. That website provided a downloadable order form
which prospective customers could print out and mail in with
payment, to do business with AAAA. No orders were taken
through the website, though it provided advertisements, an e-
10 See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
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mail address, a mailing address, and a toll-free telephone
number. Because of this, the court said that the website
functioned as a passive advertisement only, and could not be the
basis for personal jurisdiction in Texas.
From Mink, we get a refinement of the Zippo rule. The Fifth
Circuit held that personal jurisdiction would be determined by
the "level of interactivity" that the Internet contacts between
plaintiff and defendant involved, and the "commercial nature of
the exchange of information" that occurred on the website.
One end of the "sliding scale" spectrum then, is represented
by the entirely passive website that involves no sales over the
Internet, no interactivity, and no particularized solicitations of
business (or of contributions, for example) in the putative forum
state. Absent additional contacts or activities by you in the
forum state, this almost certainly is not sufficient for courts in
that state to exercise jurisdiction over you or your organization.
A case on point is Lofton v. Turbine Design, Inc.." In Lofton,
an aircraft parts manufacturer claimed that another company,
located in Florida, had defamed it and one of its individual
owners, and had stolen trade secrets from it. The defendant had
a passive web-site that explained and advertised its products
and described why its products were superior to Lofton's. This
website was also supposedly used to defame Lofton. The web-
site was viewed in Mississippi, where Lofton operated its
business, but no ordering, or even price quotes, were available
online. Lofton sued in Mississippi, claiming that courts in
Mississippi had personal jurisdiction over Turbine Designs,
based on this website.
The defendants, Turbine Design and its officers, were a
business and individuals in Florida. They were residents there,
and had their principal place of business there. Turbine Design
had no place of business, and did no business, in Mississippi.
There was no evidence of further contact with Mississippi by the
defendants, or evidence that anyone other than Lofton had
accessed the site in Mississippi, though certainly everyone with
Internet access in the state of Mississippi could have done so,
and some probably did. There was no proof of any particular
harm caused by Turbine Design oriented to Mississippi. The
court in Mississippi granted Turbine Design's motion to dismiss
11 100 F. Supp. 2d 404 (N.D. Miss. 2000).
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because it did not have personal jurisdiction over Turbine Design
or its officers.
Although Mississippi state law did permit the exercise of
jurisdiction over Turbine Design, constitutional due process
requirements did not. The Mississippi court held that it had no
"general" jurisdiction over Turbine Design because it had no
"continuous and systematic" contact with Mississippi. And the
court had no "specific jurisdiction" over the company because
Turbine Design did not establish any contacts with the state of
Mississippi which were directly related to the reasons for the
lawsuit. In fact, apart from the simple existence of the passive
website that could be accessed in Mississippi, the defendants had
had no contact with Mississippi at all. So the action was
dismissed.
Next let's deal with a little different example, a case called
Bensusan Restaurant v. King.12 There, a Missouri resident,
King, operated a nightclub business in Missouri called "The Blue
Note"-the same name as the trademarked name of a famous
jazz club in New York. King advertised his club on a website
created in Missouri, which was seen in New York. The original
Blue Note's owner sued in Federal District Court in New York
claiming trademark infringement and unfair competition in
violation of New York's laws. The question was whether the
court in New York had personal jurisdiction over this Missouri
corporation. The Missouri Blue Note hadn't done any business
in New York, was never physically present there, and New
York's long arm statute generally required a defendant to have
been physically present in, and do some act in New York, for its
courts to have jurisdiction. Though the New York club claimed
that it was injured in New York, the dismissal of its case in New
York against the Missouri club was affirmed based on the lack of
personal jurisdiction. Courts in New York could not exercise
their power over this defendant, which had its offices in, and did
business in, Missouri only.
Now let's turn to the other end of the spectrum: interactive
web-sites and repeated communications with the forum state,
via Internet, as a way of conducting business. Typically, there is
personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state person or organization
in such a case, even if that person or organization had never had
12 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
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any other contact with that state.
Consider CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson,13 one of the most
significant recent cases in the law of federal jurisdiction.
CompuServe sued a Texas company called Flashpoint, seeking a
declaratory judgment that CompuServe had not violated
Flashpoint's copyrights. CompuServe sued in Ohio, where it is
located. One reason for doing that, of course, was to gain tactical
advantage by forcing Flashpoint to come to Ohio to defend, and
another was to try to use Ohio's more favorable laws, not Texas'
laws, to test Flashpoint's conduct.
Flashpoint is in Texas and its owner never visited Ohio, but
entered into two contracts with CompuServe that stated they
were entered into in Ohio. These two contracts were agreed to
by Flashpoint's owner in Texas, who typed by computer in Texas
his agreement to the contracts. Note here, parenthetically, that
there is important federal legislation bearing on this area, in the
so-called Electronic Signatures In Global And National
Commerce Act, Public Law 106-223. Flashpoint sold its
software products over the Internet, using CompuServe. Only 12
people in Ohio bought those products, a total of $640 in sales.
CompuServe thereafter developed a similar software
product, after which Flashpoint complained, and CompuServe
sued Flashpoint in Ohio to secure a declaratory judgment.
The court found that Flashpoint had taken actions that
created a substantial connection with Ohio. It entered into
contracts that were explicit about the fact that they were entered
into under Ohio Law. Its owner sent his computer software to
CompuServe in Ohio, and communicated with CompuServe in
Ohio by e-mail and mail, and Flashpoint sold its products in
Ohio, on an ongoing basis, doing business over the Internet, via
CompuServe's computer facilities in Ohio.
The case also "arose out" of Flashpoint's activities in Ohio,
because Flashpoint advertised and sold its software from
CompuServe's Ohio-based Internet system. The court held that
Flashpoint did have sufficient contacts with Ohio to justify the
exercise of personal jurisdiction. This was the case even though
Flashpoint had only $640 worth of sales in Ohio; in my view the
decision would have been the same even if Flashpoint had sold
no products in Ohio at all.
13 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
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Note that for future reference the issue of a server's physical
location is a factor one sees noted more and more frequently in
the cases over the last 18 months or so. I do not, however, know
of any cases in which a forum state exerted personal jurisdiction
over an out-of-state entity solely because of a server's location.
In fact, this factor seems to cut a variety of ways. A server's
presence in California did not prevent a court in Texas from
exercising personal jurisdiction in Thompson v. Handa-Lopez,
Inc.,14 nor did it prevent the court in Pennsylvania from
exercising personal jurisdiction over a California corporation
whose servers were in California, in Zippo, discussed earlier.
But, it seemed to have something positive to do with the exercise
of personal jurisdiction in Ohio (the server's location) in
CompuServe, and with the court's refusal to exercise personal
jurisdiction in D.C. in GTE New Media, discussed below, when
the server was in Maryland. As a freestanding fact, in my view
it has no pivotal significance. But, it is very clear that the mere
fact that the server in question is outside the putative forum
state will not automatically prevent a court in the forum state
from exercising either specific or general jurisdiction in the
appropriate case. One clever idea is to claim general jurisdiction
wherever the defendant's servers are, on the basis that that
proves continuous and systematic Internet contacts with
whatever that state is. To my knowledge, however, that has
neither been tried or decided.
My conclusion is that wherever, as is the case with many
consumer oriented e-commerce sites, products or services can be
selected, purchased, and actually paid for over the Internet, that
will be sufficient for the exercise of personal jurisdiction in the
state where the plaintiff is a resident, at least if that company
does any substantial amount of business with residents of that
forum state. But be aware that in Molnlycke Health Care AB v.
Dumex Medical Surgical Products Ltd.,15 the court reached a
contrary conclusion. It wrote: "To hold that the possibility of
ordering products from a website establishes general jurisdiction
would effectively hold that any corporation with such a website
is subject to general jurisdiction in every state. This court is not
willing to take such a step." In my view, this decision turns on
14 998 F. Supp. 738 (W.D. Tex. 1998).
15 64 F. Supp. 2d 448 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
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the fact that the defendant was a Canadian company, there was
no specific jurisdiction, and it was a patent infringement case.
The action had nothing to do with Pennsylvania, and did not
arise out of any products purchased from Pennsylvania over the
Internet. It appeared that plaintiffs were simply trying to find
an advantageous place in the United States to sue the Canadian
company.
Now let's look at the more problematic cases, those in the
middle of the spectrum; an interactive website alone, but without
any other contacts by defendant with the forum state. In such a
case, there is probably no personal jurisdiction over the out-of-
state defendant, so long as there is no physical contact with the
putative forum state, and no business is actually done by
Internet. Note, however, that when I say "business" I do not
mean only the buying and selling of products and services, but
also other business-related processes. Please keep that in mind
when I reach the Maritz case in a moment.
Let's look at GTE New Media Services, Inc. v. BellSouth
Corp.,16 where GTE sued BellSouth, Netscape, and Yahoo
claiming anti-trust violations because the defendants had
terminated subscribers' internet access to GTE's Yellow Pages.
GTE said the defendants had agreed to certain acts, outside the
District of Columbia, that hurt GTE in D.C. by orienting
Internet users in the District of Columbia to their "Yellow
Pages"-type sites, rather than to GTE's. But GTE did not show
any contractual relationship (unlike CompuServe) that made the
defendants subject to District of Columbia law, and did not show
the defendants had specifically directed their activities to the
District of Columbia at all, or had any physical contacts with it.
Also, unlike CompuServe, GTE did not show that the defendants
conducted their business dealings with GTE in D.C., either over
the Net or otherwise.
The court held that personal jurisdiction cannot legitimately
be based only on D.C. residents' ability to access defendants'
web-sites from D.C., saying that reflects no more than a phone
call from D.C. to defendants' servers, and those servers were all
outside D.C.. The court also held that just because D.C.
residents could access the defendants' "Yellow Pages"-type
websites and use them in D.C., that does not mean the
16 199 F.3d 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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defendants were "doing business" in D.C.
This "middle of the spectrum" is also where I would locate
the cases where a high level of interactivity has led to a finding
of personal jurisdiction, even absent any purchases, contracts, or
agreements being effected over the Internet.
Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc.,17 is such a case. The
defendant, Cybergold, was in the process of creating an Internet
service business, and it put up a website to promote it. The
defendant's business model called for advertisers to pay
Cybergold for the privilege of being included in selective
electronic "mailings" to narrowly-focused groups of subscribers.
There was no such service yet, but the promotional site asked
those interested in subscribing to send in their e-mail addresses
to a mailing list over the Internet, so as to get updates about this
product. Obviously, Cybergold later intended to use these lists of
likely subscribers when it came time to sell its services. The
plaintiffs claims against Cybergold were based on theories of
trademark infringement related to this business idea. Even
though the plaintiff, a Missouri resident, had never bought
anything over the net from Cybergold, or entered into any
contracts or agreements with it, the court held Cybergold subject
to personal jurisdiction in Missouri, where plaintiff had sued.
The court said that Cybergold was engaging, on the Internet, in
active solicitation and promotion intended to develop a mailing
list of Internet users interested in a particular sort of Internet
service, a valuable commercial commodity. Cybergold was doing
this in a heavily interactive way. Thus, it was doing far more
than merely advertising an upcoming service; it was doing its
business, over the Internet, in Missouri.
Now let's look at a variation on the theme: a passive web-
site, plus a toll-free number provided for further contacts.
Usually there is no personal jurisdiction anywhere other than
where the defendant is actually located, in such a case. In fact,
such a case sounds like the defendants have substantially less
contact with the forum state, than was the case in GTE,
discussed above. But, there is a "minority view" that says this
can be the basis for personal jurisdiction in a distant forum
state, in some particular circumstances. I stress that this is a
minority view, what the Zippo opinion called the "outer limits" of
17 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
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Constitutionally-permissible personal jurisdiction.
The case I want to discuss in this regard is Inset Systems,
Inc. v. Instructional Set, Inc.,18 Inset is a Connecticut company,
which found that a Massachusetts company calling itself
"Instructional Set, Inc.," had obtained the Internet domain name
"Inset.com," although Inset owned the trademark on "Inset."
This is a so-called "cyber-squatting" case. Inset sued in
Connecticut to stop Instructional from using that trademark or
domain name, claiming that the federal court in Connecticut had
personal jurisdiction over Instructional, a Massachusetts
corporation with all its offices and places of business in
Massachusetts. Instructional advertised on the Internet and
provided an 800-number to a Massachusetts office, which
customers in Connecticut and elsewhere could use to reach it. It
did not, however, contract for or sell its services over the net,
either to residents of Connecticut, or residents of any other state.
The federal district court in Connecticut, somewhat
surprisingly, found it had personal jurisdiction over
Instructional, even though Instructional had no physical
contacts with Connecticut, and did not have an interactive
website or enter into agreements over the Internet with people
in Connecticut. It found this because Instructional provided its
toll-free telephone number to numerous Connecticut Internet
users, advertised widely on the Internet (which could be accessed
by all Internet-connected people in Connecticut), and
particularly because the facts showed that Instructional had
tried to "orient" and direct its activities on the Web to take
business away from Inset, in Connecticut.
Let me conclude with three red flags which I think
summarize the state of the law at present: if your activities or
dioceses intend to have truly interactive web sites, or to actually
complete business transactions over the web, or take actions that
reasonably could be seen as having substantial effects
intentionally oriented to some other specific state, then please
carefully review the situation with a view to what the
jurisdictional consequences might be. On the other hand, if you
have only a passive website providing information, even with
telephone numbers or additional ways of locating information on
the Internet, including e-mail addresses, this probably does not
18 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
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present a substantial risk that you may be forced into court in
another state.
Here are some possible prophylactic responses to consider,
which should be of use both from a jurisdictional and a choice of
law perspective.
L.A restrictive "banner" notification, text statement, or
"terms of use."'19
a) Indicate an intent to do business only where you
are comfortable litigating, or at least not where
you are not.
b) Require entrance of only specified state's mailing
addresses, and/or provide toll-free telephone
numbers to effect contacts, that only work from
within the state you intend to "do business" in.
c) If you are selling products or services, put explicit
language in the purchasing form saying whose
law will be applied, and/or what it is.
d) Note that this may not work unless the language
is especially prominent and a reasonable person
would have noticed it.20
2.The "click-through agreement"21 similar to "shrink wrap
agreements."
a) Include, in the text of the agreement, explicit
personal jurisdiction, forum selection, and choice
of law provisions. Then make certain that no
business is conducted, nor are responses provided,
unless the "customer" agrees to these provisions
explicitly, by "clicking through" that step in the
computer process.
b) Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C.,22 upheld a
forum selection clause imposed in this way.
There are also some state statutes bearing on this
issue, and cases enforcing the substantive
contract provisions of click-through agreements,
like Hotmail Corp. v. Van$Money Pie, Inc..23
19 See Decker v. Circus Circus Hotel, 49 F. Supp. 2d 743 (D.N.J. 1999).
20 See Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, 998 F. Supp. 738 (W.D. Tex. 1998).
21 See Stomp v. NeatO, L.L.C., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1074 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
22 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
23 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10729 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998). But see, America
Online, Inc. v. Mendoza, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699 (2001).
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3.In the alternative, or if you use a "click-through"
agreement and no agreement is forthcoming, provide
only advertising-type information and a downloadable
order form. 24
a) This causes the customer to mail you an order or
inquiry and puts you in the drivers seat.
b) If used in combination with the click-through
agreements described above, this may also be
useful to help show that there were practical
alternatives to acceptance of the "click-through
agreement," and so enforcement of its provisions
is not improper, since there was a genuine
meeting of the minds. This avoids one of the
enforcement problems inherent in "shrink wrap
agreements."
c) If the subsequent dealings are by way of the mails
or telephone, then traditional jurisdictional
standards applicable in such situations would be
used.
24 See Remick v. Manfredy, 52 F. Supp. 2d 452 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
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